Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Wrestling with what IS and IS NOT supplemental information for a GIPS presentation

True Confession Time: years ago, when the concept of "supplemental information" was being introduced, I opposed the idea of actually "labeling" this information. While understanding the notion of supplemental is important, I didn't see much value in having to label it. Today, my view hasn't changed. But that doesn't matter: the rule is that one must label if you're a GIPS(R) (Global Investment Performance Standards) compliant firm. [But, I want to make it clear that this comment doess not constitute a criticism of either the Standards or those who crafted them. It's merely an opinion.]

Now, the tricky part: what to label?

Let's begin with a definition of  what supplemental information is; from the Standards' glossary we have:
Bottom line, it's performance-related information that's neither required nor recommended. And so, when you want to include performance or risk information along with your compliant statement, you need to decide if it's supplemental or not, because if it is, you have to label it.

As GIPS verifiers, we often encounter clients who have elected to include additional information, and must consider whether it's supplemental or not. Let's consider the following two examples, from recent verifications we conducted:
  • benchmark risk statistics, other than the required 36-month annualized standard deviation: while the standards recommend that firms "present additional relevant COMPOSITE-level EX-POST risk measures" (see ¶ I.5.B.6), it doesn't suggest the same for benchmarks. Was this an oversight? Is there a sense that this may be implied? Think about it: to show, for example, the Sharpe ratio for the composite but not the benchmark has limited value, right? But, strictly speaking one might conclude that it has to be labeled. I'm of the opinion that this is a "gray area," and am fine either way: want to label it? Fine! Don't want to? I'm okay with that.
  • growth of a dollar (or Euro, Pound Sterling, etc.): while charts are recommended, I believe only of information that's recommended or required. And so, since such a chart (or the underlying data) isn't recommended nor required, I'd say this falls into the "supplemental camp," and requires a label.
What if you fail to label something, is your claim invalid? I would say "no." I think that this would be a minor infraction, and one that simply needs correction.

What if you label something that really isn't supplemental? I'd call this an oversight, and say that it does not invalidate the claim. Once made aware of the error, simply remove the label.

Have a different view, thoughts, insights, or other examples? Please chime in!

Friday, July 20, 2012

The Spaulding Group to host Risk Week: an online conference event

The Spaulding Group will host Risk Week this coming fall. It will be a week of daily webinars, covering a variety of risk topics.

Risk measurement's importance to the investment industry has never been greater; thus our belief that a week of daily sessions, conducted by leading authorities, will benefit many.

Last year, we held Attribution Week, which was very well received. This format seems to be quite attractive, as it involves no travel, has a minimal time commitment, and yet provides an organization with great content. Its flexible format allows you to sign up for one or more of the sessions (i.e., pick and choose the ones that most appeal to you). Or, sign up for the full week!

To learn more, please visit our conference website, or call (732-873-5700) or email either Patrick Fowler or Christopher Spaulding.

Thursday, July 19, 2012

More on representative accounts and GIPS compliance

A Spaulding Group verification client recently sent me the following note:

Hi Dave, I’m hoping you can answer a questions for us very quickly.  Our CCO and I are having a disagreement over whether representative account performance from a composite can be shown alongside the composite performance being presented to a prospect.  The guidance statement indicates that supplemental information like carve-outs, country weightings and hypothetical performance can be shown as supplemental information but does not specifically reference a representative account from the composite.

You may recall that I blogged about this subject last month. I stand by my earlier statement that GIPS(R) (Global Investment Performance Standards) compliant firms may, in fact, include details from a representative account to a prospect. However, it's important that appropriate disclosures be included.

I was reminded of the risks with rep accounts while listening to a weight loss program advertisement. The examples they provided seemed extreme, and in fact they disclosed this, saying that these examples were "not typical." At least they provided some degree of clarity, though this may be overlooked by many who are seeking  a quick cure to their overweight problem. In the case of performance, the degree that a rep account can be deemed "typical" may be difficult to discern, so again, make sure you sufficiently explain what's being shown. Ideally, what it represents, how it was chosen, how other account experiences may differ, etc.

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

Performance attribution with derivatives

One area that often results in a lot of confusion (and probably some controversy) is how one should calculate performance attribution of a portfolio that includes derivatives. I have been of the opinion that if the portfolio holds anything that isn't represented in the benchmark (I'm not speaking of specific securities, but from a broader, asset class or sector perspective), it deserves special attention.

I am currently designing an attribution model for a client that invests in options, alongside their equities. I must confess that putting this together with their data is taking a bit longer than I had planned, but I am hopeful we will present them with a valuable tool they can use with their clients and prospects.

The general approach is to segregate the options from the equities. And since these are covered writes, the covering securities or cash will be with the options.

The result will be a clean portrayal of where the return comes from.

More details will follow, most likely in The Spaulding Group's monthly newsletter. So stay tuned!

Monday, July 16, 2012

Occasions when the cure is worse than the disease

In their classic, A Monetary History of the United States, 1967- 1960, Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz observed that FDR's bank holiday, shortly after he took office in 1933, which was supposed to have been a cure was, in reality, "worse than the disease."

A recent WSJ OpEd piece titled "The Dodd-Frank Downgrade" suggested that it, too, created a worse situation: "by issuing a series of downgrades of giant banks this week, Moody's Investors Service may have performed a taxpayer service. Two years ago President Obama and Congressional Democrats told Americans they have strengthened the banking system and revoked too-big-to-fail privileges from the financial giants. Now Moody's can help Americans understand  that the Dodd-Frank law has fulfilled neither promise. The law's signature achievements are higher costs, reduced opportunities and weaker banks."

This post isn't intended as a criticism of our president or the Democrats in Congress, but rather how unintended consequences can lead to results not necessarily foreseen, which can put us in worse shape. This appears to have been the case with this law.

Any rule making body runs the risk of causing such difficulties. When rules are considered their intent is usually for the good, but on occasion create unintended difficulties for those the rules are  designed to serve. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to project ahead what the impact may be. This is one of the benefits of soliciting public comment in advance of making rules official. And while this isn't a fail-safe measure, it at least provides additional opinions to surface which may, in fact, reveal problems that would result.

Saturday, July 14, 2012

First Madoff, now Wasendorf: Knowing who you can trust is getting increasingly difficult

I sometimes jokingly say that since I was once a politician, lying comes naturally to me. And we know how politicians typically rank on the scale of trustworthiness. Lawyers and used car salesmen are also among those who seem to garner little respect in the trust department. But I believe that historically, those investors who have met with great success and who have contributed to important causes have been held in the highest levels of our respect, esteem and confidence. But that has changed.

First, it was Bernie Madoff, whose multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme was detected after 20 years of organized fraud, that apparently involved several of those who worked for him.

And this past week we learned of Russell Wasendorf, Sr.'s nearly 20 years of fraud, which resulted in the stealing of $100 million. In his case, he both admitted to the crime (in his suicide note) and claims sole responsibility for this action.

And while Wasendorf's stature and success may not have been as widely known as Madoff's, he was still one who garnered great respect from many in the industry, as well as those in his local community.

Fraud is nothing new, of course, and perhaps really isn't that uncommon. Our local paper today speaks about a New Brunswick (NJ) accountant who was found guilty of check kiting and defrauding two banks of $1.5 million. But this guilty party (Amro Badran) is not a public figure, as Madoff and Wasendorf were.

Those individuals who stole, but then gained public attention through their apparent good deeds, are ones who may have, by these same acts of generosity, been able to increase the degree of their illicit behavior.

I'm sure many are now wondering, who next? Or, what can we do to catch these folks sooner? I don't think there are any easy answers. Sadly, the risk of fraud by highly regarded investment professionals seems to be on the increase, though.

But also what is sad is that Madoff and Wasendorf tarnish our industry. A priest who is a family friend mentioned a few years ago how he was in a men's room, and a man and his young son were standing by the sink. Our friend was in his priestly garb (e.g., Roman collar) and the father told the boy to stay by him when he saw our priest. I.e., the scandal that has rocked the Catholic church had caused some to stereotype about priests, even though a very small percentage are guilty of child abuse.

Likewise, I am confident that a very small percentage of folks in our industry are guilty of fraud. But stories like these don't help in the "PR" department.

Thursday, July 12, 2012

Benchmarks & the GIPS standards

We have gotten a series of questions lately regarding the inclusion of benchmarks in a GIPS(R) (Global Investment Performance Standards) presentation. I'll summarize some of it here.

Secondary benchmarks: can a firm show additional benchmarks along with their primary? Yes! But you must make it clear which is the primary.

Absolute benchmarks: can these be included in a presentation? Absolutely! In some cases an absolute benchmark would be the ideal one. If it is actually a secondary one (which is the case with one of The Spaulding Group's verification clients), the primary has to be identified. In addition, details regarding the absolute need to be included, as appropriate, so the reader understands what it represents and how it's constructed.

Reference benchmarks: in some cases firms show benchmarks which don't align with the actual composite's strategy, but rather for reference purposes. Can these be shown and must they be flagged as being "supplemental"? First, yes, they can be shown. Second, no, they aren't supplemental.

The GIPS glossary defines a benchmark as:

And so, a reference benchmark clearly matches the definition, and neither warrants nor requires the "supplemental information" disclosure, since it's not supplemental. Again, clarity is needed to ensure the benchmark's role is clear.

Have additional thoughts, insights, ideas, or questions? Please chime in!